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ABSTRACT
Increased uncertainty in the economic and business environments have placed IS function and IS leadership in a quandary
today. In this paper, we empirically examine the remuneration of CIOs, and examine their association with firm performance,
size and industry membership. Based on compensation data of 213 CIOs in 2002, we test several hypotheses linking the total,
annual cash, and long term components of the CIO compensation with firm and industry variables. Our results indicate a
strong relationship between CIO compensation and performance, firm size, and industry membership. Firm performance
exhibited a strong positive association with all components of CIO pay. Firm size was found to have significant positive
association with the total pay and the annual cash components. We also found support for association between specific
industry memberships (finance and insurance, manufacturing, and professional services) and CIO pay.
Key words and phrases
Chief Information Officer, Compensation, firm performance, firm size, industry membership
INTRODUCTION
Since the IS organization’s inception in the 1960s, IS leadership has ascended up the organizational hierarchies to become a
critical part of the top management teams. From technical and middle-management roles, IS leadership has evolved into a
senior management position that shapes up and drives the business strategies of organizations. As technologies and systems
permeated within and outside the firm boundaries, IT became an integral and critical component of the business. The rise in
IT’s role was accompanied by an elevation in the position of the CIOs as organizations rewarded them with higher
compensations, key responsibilities, inclusion in upper echelons of corporate management and other perquisites. A study by
an executive search firm reported that in late 1990s, 15% of CIOs served in their company’s executive boards and 70% were
a part of high-level management teams (Heller, 2000).
However, turn of the century and subsequent economic downswings have proved to be trying times for most CIOs. Pressure
to prune IT costs, and increased efforts to outsource and offshore IT projects have placed a question mark on the future role
of IS function and IS leadership in organizations. Questions have been raised about the strategic contributions of IT and the
value of CIO function in organizations. A Harvard Business Review (HBR) article titled “Are CIOs obsolete?” (Maruca,
2000) sparked a wide-spread debate in industry and academic circles about the role of CIOs. More recently, another HBR
article “IT Doesn’t Matter?” (Carr, 2003) questioned the strategic relevance of IT in business. Such debates have brought into
focus the compensation paid to the CIOs.
Today, there is an increased interest in business circles about CIO compensation. Anecdotal evidence and business press
reports suggest a decline in the compensation of CIOs in recent years, indicating a possible wane in the role of IS leaders. A
study by the CIO magazine showed that the number of CIOs who report to CFOs (rather than the CEOs) doubled in 2003
from 11% in 2002, implying a reduction in the CIO clout and responsibility (Overby, 2003). A study by Janet Associates
pointed to a 16% decrease in CIO salaries from 2001 to 2003 (Overby, 2003).  Annual surveys of CIO compensation by
Baseline magazine also point to similar trends (Baseline, 2003).
While industry circles are buzz with debates about CIO compensation, academic research in this area is almost nonexistent.
IS researchers have focused their attention on the role of CIOs (Grover, Jeong, and Ketinger, 1993; Ross and Feeny, 1999),
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CIO-CEO relationships (Feeny, Edwards and Simpson, 1992), and CIO’s influence behaviors (Enns, Huff and Higgins,
2003). Further, limited research has examined the compensation of IT workers (Ang, Slaughter and Ng, 2002) and IT
industry executives (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran, 2000). However, little empirical knowledge exists on CIO
compensation. Our study seeks to address this important gap. Our research has the following objectives:
(i) To understand the relationship between firm performance and CIO compensation
(ii) To assess the association between firm size and CIO compensation
(iii) To examine if there are industry-specific differences in CIO compensation.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Agency theory has been used by economists to explain the rationale behind compensation awarded to executives and
employees in an organization (Eisenhardt, 1989; Garen, 1994). According to this theory, a firm is seen as an arrangement of
implicit and explicit contracts among multiple members such as owners, managers, employees and other stakeholders who
contribute to the firm’s functioning and in return receive some compensation for it. Owners are principals who have contracts
with managers (agents), where the contracts specify the agreement between the principal and agent on responsibilities, rights,
duties and payoffs for the same. The costs of maintaining the principal-agent relationships and monitoring the agents are
termed as agency costs. The duality of principals and agents leads to agency costs in two ways (Mangel and Singh, 1993).
First, principals might incur some opportunity costs due to potential goal incongruence between the two parties. Principal
may incur some losses when agents pursue objectives that are different. Second, information asymmetries between principal
and agents might increase the monitoring costs as the agents who control the key organizational resources and are responsible
for day-to-day organizational functioning have better knowledge about the tasks at hand. Agency theory suggests designing
appropriate compensation contracts with some risks-sharing between the principal and agents to control the agency costs.
Several studies on executive compensation draw upon the agency theory to understand the design of compensation and
incentive structures for senior executives. In this study, we extend this line of enquiry by applying agency theory arguments
to the compensation of CIOs. Based on a number of extant studies on executive compensation (Balkin, Markman, and
Gomez-Mejia, 2000; Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996; Zajac and Westphal, 1995) and anecdotal reports on CIO pay
(Baseline, 2003; CIO, 2000), we propose specific associations between CIO remuneration and three variables – firm
performance, firm size and industry membership. In the following sections, we propose specific hypotheses for these
associations and present our rationale for the hypotheses concerning CIO compensation.
Firm performance and CIO compensation
Two distinct, yet complementary theoretical perspectives - the human resources (HR) and agency theories - provide the
fundamental grounding to understand the association between CIO compensation and firm performance (Zajac and Westphal
1995). The HR perspective is rooted in the belief that managerial talent is a scarce resource and  organizations have to offer
an attractive compensation package to lure and retain the best talents (Zajac and Westphal 1995). The compensation would
serve as a primary motivation for these talented managers to lead the firm to higher growth and progress. Agency theory
focuses on the duality of principal (shareholders) agent (manager or a CIO) relationship, suggesting execution of an outcome-
based contract with the agent (Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia, 2000) so that they justify the compensation received
with desired performance outcomes. In addition to the above theories, Murphy (1985) argues that economic theories of
efficient compensation mandate a positive relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. In sum,
the central idea behind these theories is a linkage between a firm’s performance and executive compensation. In line with the
above theories, we argue that firms with better performance need to hire or retain CIOs with good pay, which may further
enhance their business performance.
A number of researchers have empirically examined the association between firm performance and executive compensation.
Murphy (1985) found strong association between executive compensation and firm performance measured by firm sales and
shareholder return. Carr (1997) studied small firms to find a significant relationship between sales and CEO compensation.
Rajagopalan and Prescott (1990) also found empirical evidence of the association between executive compensation and
economic measures like firm performance and size. These studies did not explicitly examine CIOs. However, since most
CIOs are members of senior executive team, the results from executive compensation literature could possibly be extended to
the realm of CIOs as well. Therefore, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s performance is likely to be positively related to its CIO compensation.
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Firm size and CIO compensation
According to executive labor market perspective, the market performs the following three functions (Rosen, 1990). First, in
equilibrium market environment, the most talented executives get efficiently allocated to the largest firms. Second, the
executive contracts have provisions to make executives take decisions in the interests of the shareholders. Third, the
executive labor markets look for new talent to replace the older generations. This provides the basic theoretical rationale to
examine the association between firm size and executive compensation (Zhou, 2000). Extending the executive labor market
arguments, we propose that more experienced and talented CIOs (who would command greater salaries) are likely to be
assigned to larger firms by the labor markets. Larger organizations with significant computing and information-processing
needs require IS leaderships with considerable talent and experience. The complexities in managing IS function and IT
resources has been found to increase with firm size (DeLone, 1981). Higher the organization size, greater are likely to be its
computing requirements, thus leading to more managerial responsibilities for managing the IS function. Given the increased
complexity in leading IS function in large firms, CIOs need to be compensated adequately in return for their leadership.
These arguments suggest a strong theoretical link between firm size and CIO compensation.
Firm size has been one of most consistent predictors of executive compensation (Deckop, 1988; Ghosh; Gray and Cannella,
1997). Tosi et al. (2000) did a meta-analysis of CEO pay studies to find that firm size accounted for more than 40% of
variance in CEO pay. Eaton and Rosen (1983) used number of employees as a proxy for company size to explain patterns of
executive compensation. Zhou (2000) examined Canadian firms over the period 1991-95 and found CEO pay to rise with
firm size. The theoretical arguments based on executive labor markets and the   empirical support linking firm size and
executive compensation together suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: A firm’s size is likely to be positively related to its CIO compensation.
Industry membership and CIO compensation
According to information processing view advanced by Galbraith (1973), organizations are fundamentally information
processing structures, and firms are designed to marshal adequate information processing and communication capabilities in
order to cope up with the complexity and uncertainty in the external environment. Daft and Langel (1986) advanced the view
that organizations process information in order to reduce task uncertainty and resolve equivocality. Depending on the
industry environment, the amount of task uncertainty and equivocality might vary. Porter and Miller (1985) introduced the
notion of “information intensity” and argued that the industry characteristics play a significant role in determining the
information processing demands in organizations. Given the wide variation in information processing requirements across
industries, researchers have found IT usage and IT roles to significantly vary across industries. Firms operating in more
information-intensive industries are likely to place greater demands on the IS function and the IS leadership. Firms where
technology plays a transformational role are likely to place greater emphasis on their IS leaderships than those firms where
technology plays a mere automation or informating roles. This increased importance to IS leadership is likely to be
manifested in the form of higher compensation to CIOs.
Research studies on executive compensation have reported differences in the pay structures across different industries
(Rajagopalan and Prescott, 1990). Deckop’s (1988) study on the linkage between firm profitability and CEO compensation
found significant inter-industry variations in CEO compensation. Further, Eaton and Rosen (1983) found that the level and
type of executive remuneration varied significantly across industries. Chaterjee, Richardson and Zmud (2001) found creation
of new CIO positions in industries with transformational IT role to generate more positive reactions from shareholders. This
also suggests potential industry differences in the CIO function. Industries that are more competitive or information-intensive
are likely to pose greater challenges for CIOs, which in turn would influence their compensation packages. Hence, we believe
that CIO compensation would have an association with the firm’s industry membership.
Hypothesis 3: A firm’s industry membership is likely to be related to its CIO compensation.
RESEARCH METHODS
Data
We assembled a database of CIO compensation through an extensive search of public disclosures made by firms in their SEC
filings. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandates all US public companies to disclose the executive
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compensation paid to the top named executive officers in their annual proxy statements. We conducted detailed search on the
EDGAR SEC filing database (available via the LexisNexis) and scanned the proxy statements of all the firms in the database
to identify the compensation disclosures pertaining to senior IT executives. Our search resulted in a final usable dataset of
compensation details of 213 CIOs in 2002.
Measures
Components of CIO Compensation
The primary dependant variable in our analysis is the CIO compensation. Prior research on executive pay has examined three
components of executive compensation – annual cash compensation, incentive compensation, and total compensation
(Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996; Westpal and Zajac, 1994). Annual cash compensation comprises salary, bonuses, and
other annual compensation such as travel etc. This represents the short-term pay that is typically paid in cash annually to the
executives (Balkin et al., 2000; Westpal and Zajac, 1994). Incentive compensation represents long-term elements such as
stock options, performance unit or shares, restricted stock, and long-term management incentive plans. Total compensation is
the sum of cash and long-term compensation.
We extracted all the three components of CIO compensation from the company proxy statements. Annual cash compensation
computations were straight forward as proxy statements specify the exact dollar values of these components. Stock options
were valued at 25 percent of their exercise price – This approach to valuing the stock options has been widely used in the
literature. Further, this approach produces values in a range similar to more sophisticated methods such as the Black-Scholes
approach (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996; Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt, 1993). Exercise price of each stock option was
also identified from proxy statements. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Henderson and Fredrickson 1996; Lambert and
Larcker, 1987), we use the natural logarithms of compensation components in order to minimize the heteroscedasticity in our
analytical models.
Independent variables
We had three independent variables - firm performance, firm size, and industry membership. For assessing performance, we
used firm sales as the operational measure. This is in accordance with similar treatments in the literature (Henderson and
Fredrickson, 1996). Given the information-processing arguments stated earlier, the number of employees was chosen as the
appropriate measure of firm size. The basic rationale is that the higher number of employees represent greater number of end-
users, thus leading to increased demands on IS leadership. This measure has also been used in prior studies on compensation
(Eaton and Rosen, 1983; Rajagopalan and Prescott, 1990). We gathered the data on firm performance and firm size from
COMPUSTAT  database.  Similar  to  CIO  compensation  data,  we  used  the  natural  logarithms  of  firm  sales  and  number  of
employees. Industry memberships formed the third independent variable of our study. We used the two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to identify the industry membership of firms in our dataset. We had five industry groups
represented in our sample: manufacturing, transportation communication and utilities, wholesale and retail, finance and
insurance and business services.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and demographics of our dataset are provided in Tables. 1A and 1B. As can be seen from Table.1B, we
had a heterogeneous set with wide representation from diverse industries. To examine our research hypotheses, the following
model was specified and estimated:
We estimated three OLS regression models, one for each component of CIO compensation COMPi,. We regressed
compensation against performance (PERF), firm size (SIZE) and dummy variables (INDj ) for industry groups.   The results
of our analyses are provided in Table.2.
                                                                         n
        COMPi = ?0 + ?1 PERF +??2 SIZE  +??j? INDj + ?
                                                                        j=1
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Mean ($) S.D
Annual Cash Compensation 408774 351479
Incentive Compensation 286373 655161
Total Compensation 695148 932339
Performance
( Sales)
3,849,817,192 9,006,062,535
Size
(No of Employees)
15570 37595
Table.1A. Descriptive Statistics
Industry No of CIOs
(#)
Average Cash
Compensation
($)
Average
Incentive
Compensation
($)
Average Total
Compensation
($)
Manufacturing Related 37 403172 294910 698082
Transportation, Communication & Utilities 18 496361 509437 1005798
Wholesale and Retail 59 434217 351420 785637
Finance & Insurance 46 496848 533847 1030695
Business, professional services & real estate 54 336773 185281 522054
Table.1B. Demographics
Cash
Compensation
Incentive
Compensation
Total
Compensation
PERF (Annual Sales) 0.634** 0.358* 0.686**
SIZE (No. of Employees) 0.212* 0.150 0.194*
IND - Finance and Insurance 0.209** 0.103 0.212**
IND - Business, Professional Services & Real Estate 0.202** 0.095 0.244**
IND - Transportation, Communication & Utilities 0.041 0.035 0.038
IND - Manufacturing related industries 0.056 0.080 0.101*
Adjusted R2 0.62** 0.21** 0.67**
F Statistic 58.74** 10.40** 71.52**
Table 2. Results of OLS Regression Analysis
Note: N = 213; standardized regression coefficients are shown in the table; *p < .05 **p < .001
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From the R-squared values displayed in Table.2, it can be seen that all the three models explained significant amount of
variance in CIO compensation components. Performance had a positive and significant association with all the three
components of CIO compensation, lending support for Hypothesis 1. Size had a significant positive association with cash and
total compensation (p < 0.05). We did not find any significant association between size and long term compensation. Our
third hypotheses linking industry membership and CIO compensation also sound strong support. Membership of firms in
information-intensive industries such as finance & insurance, and business & professional services had a significant positive
association with cash and total CIO compensation.
DISCUSSION
This study focused on three critical variables viz. performance, size and industry memberships and their associations with
CIO compensation. Based on our results, we found significant associations between all the three variables and different
components of CIO compensation. Cash compensation and total compensation awarded to CIOs seem to be influenced by
performance, size as well as industry membership. However, incentive compensation in the form of stock options and long
term incentives seem to be associated only with firm performance.
Our analysis indicated a strong and significant association of firm performance on all the three components of CIO
compensation. In fact, based on the regression coefficients, performance seem to be exhibit stronger associations with CIO
compensation than the other independent variables. This strong association between firm performance and CIO compensation
components could be interpreted in two ways. First, greater firm performance could be attributed partly to successful IS
leadership in these organizations and higher cash compensation could be construed as a reward for the work of the CIOs in
contributing to the firm performance. Second, a firm performing well is likely to be under significant pressure to sustain and
further enhance its revenues. This pressure is likely to place greater demands on the IS leadership over a longer term. Long
term incentives in the form of stock options could motivate CIOs to continue their managerial functioning and work harder to
generate additional performance improvements.
Our results indicate a positive and significant association between firm size (measured by the number of employees) and cash
and total pay awarded to CIOs. Lack of support for a size – incentive compensation relationship implies that the rewards for
managing a large base of end-users is likely to manifest as higher annual cash compensations awarded to CIOs, rather than
through long term incentives.
Our results linking industry memberships and CIO cash compensation lends support to the notion that the information-
intensity in industries, and the resultant complexities in managing an IS function is likely to help CIOs get better cash
compensation, than long term incentives. CIOs operating in industries such as finance, insurance and business services get
higher cash remuneration than those in other industries such as manufacturing, communication and utilities. This could be
explained by the increased complexity of CIO function in information-intensive industries.
In summary our study shows that CIOs managing a larger base of end-users and more complex IS function in highly
information-intensive industries are likely to receive greater cash compensation in return for their work. However, CIOs
operating in high performing firms who get challenged to further enhance and sustain such high business performance tend to
get rewarded in the form of long term incentive plans, in addition to high cash compensations.
CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Dynamic changes in business and IT environments have placed IS leadership at a critical inflexion point. Despite the
increased attention on CIO positions and CIO roles, little empirical research has been conducted to examine CIO
compensation. Our study addresses this void and throws light on the associations between firm performance, size, industry
memberships and CIO compensation. One of the significant contributions of our study lies in delineating specific variables
that affect the cash and long term incentive compensation of CIOs. Another important contribution is further validation of
industry-specific differences in CIO pay.
By examining an important and yet under-researched area of CIO compensation, we believe our study has laid some
foundations for further rigorous empirical research in this area. Research on CIO compensation is not only important, but will
also be timely. We have also extended the extant literature of IT personnel compensation by providing some insights into
CIO compensation. The findings of this research can be of use to existing, potential CIOs as well as senior executives in
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charge of framing and designing CIO compensations structures. Our findings could serve as inputs for devising compensation
packages for CIOs and other senior IS executives in organizations.
Our research has several limitations that need to be kept in mind while interpreting the results of this study. Our dataset is
restricted to a time period of one year only. Further, our sample consists of only those firms who have included CIOs among
the named executive officers – these named officers are the highest paid executives in the organization. Moreover, our
analysis was restricted to three key variables. Components of CIO compensation are likely to be associated with other firm-
specific, industry as well as CIO-specific characteristics as well. For instance, market capitalization has been found to have
strong association with long term incentive compensation of executives. CIO-specific characteristics such as their education
and expertise are likely to affect their compensation as well. A fruitful extension of this study would be to examine such
additional factors. Lastly, future researchers may also like to examine our industry groupings and analyze each industry more
closely in light of our findings.
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